IB/uverbs: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address arithmetic
authorShachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
Wed, 18 Mar 2015 17:39:08 +0000 (17:39 +0000)
committerRoland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Thu, 2 Apr 2015 16:53:59 +0000 (09:53 -0700)
Properly verify that the resulting page aligned end address is larger
than both the start address and the length of the memory area requested.

Both the start and length arguments for ib_umem_get are controlled by
the user. A misbehaving user can provide values which will cause an
integer overflow when calculating the page aligned end address.

This overflow can cause also miscalculation of the number of pages
mapped, and additional logic issues.

Addresses: CVE-2014-8159
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c

index aec7a6aa2951db47bc6b5be969a29d1867688b23..8c014b5dab4c82ff805a744c89655555a56094fc 100644 (file)
@@ -99,6 +99,14 @@ struct ib_umem *ib_umem_get(struct ib_ucontext *context, unsigned long addr,
        if (dmasync)
                dma_set_attr(DMA_ATTR_WRITE_BARRIER, &attrs);
 
+       /*
+        * If the combination of the addr and size requested for this memory
+        * region causes an integer overflow, return error.
+        */
+       if ((PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size) <= size) ||
+           (PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size) <= addr))
+               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
        if (!can_do_mlock())
                return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);