random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe()
authorTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Sat, 25 Feb 2017 22:21:33 +0000 (18:21 -0400)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 24 Apr 2018 07:32:07 +0000 (09:32 +0200)
commit010f0fb42c2a19b71405ead2009164e4dcf78a00
tree69583aedb064664de758b90492be9b47a35c0c5d
parent00cf298fae0bcee000bad030574b70307175219b
random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe()

commit 9f886f4d1d292442b2f22a0a33321eae821bde40 upstream.

This fixes a harmless UBSAN where root could potentially end up
causing an overflow while bumping the entropy_total field (which is
ignored once the entropy pool has been initialized, and this generally
is completed during the boot sequence).

This is marginal for the stable kernel series, but it's a really
trivial patch, and it fixes UBSAN warning that might cause security
folks to get overly excited for no reason.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Chen Feng <puck.chen@hisilicon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/char/random.c